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DEFINING LANGUAGE AND CREATIVITY 
The first thing that will become apparent to readers of this book is that questions 
regarding the relationship between language and creativity are complex and multifaceted, 
contingent on how one defines ‘creativity’ and how one defines 'language', neither of 
which allow for easy definition. 
 
The term 'creativity' is particularly notorious for being difficult to pin down, and the 
authors of the following chapters define it in variety of ways, each of these ways aligning 
them to particular disciplinary traditions (such as psychology, cognitive sciences, 
sociology, philosophy, and literary studies). For some, creativity is located in the minds 
of individuals, whereas for others it is more a matter of an interaction among broader 
social forces. For some the term creativity is used to describe a process undertaken by 
individuals or groups, whereas others use the term to describe the characteristics of 
particular products such as linguistic forms, works of art, or clever solutions problems. 
 
Although the definition of ‘language’ seems much more straightforward, in the context of 
this book it is also highly contested. Do we mean by language an abstract system of 
meaning making that exists independent of its use, or are we more interested in the way 
people use language in particular social contexts? Is language more a matter of what goes 
on in the individual mind of the language user, or is it more a matter of what goes on 
between people when language users interact? What sorts of language should scholars 
interested in creativity focus on? What makes some instances of language use more 
creative than other instances? 
 
Rather than dwelling on the differences and disputes among proponents of different 
definitions of language and creativity, I would like to use this introduction to construct a 
conceptual framework in which the different perspectives represented in this book can be 
profitably related to one another. That is, at the risk of sounding overly optimistic, I 
would like to suggest that that not only are all of the sometimes competing definitions of 
language and creativity represented in this book valid, but that they can be seen to 
actually complement and inform one another when situated in a broader conceptual ‘map’ 
of creativity, one which takes into account both product and process, both system and 
use, and both the individual mind and social interaction.  
 
A complete picture of linguistic creativity must take into account at least four aspects of 
the phenomenon: 1) the materials out of which people create things, specifically the 
semitoitc resources people have available for creativity 2) the cognitive processes that 
take place within individuals’ minds that make linguistic creativity possible; 3) the social 
processes necessary for linguistic creativity; and finally, 4) what is created, the product 
of the interaction among the other three aspects, whether it be a textual artefact, a verbal 
interaction, or some nonverbal outcome like the resolution of a problem, the 
transformation of a social relationship, or the invention of a new social practice (see 
Figure 1.1). 
 
[Insert Figure 1.1 here] 
 
Figure 1.1: Conceptual map for language and creativity 
 
In the chapters of this Handbook you will find that different authors tend to concentrate 
their attention on different territories of this map, some focusing more on linguistic 
resources, others on cognitive processes, others on social processes, and still others on 
creative products.  At the same time, you will also be hard pressed to find any author who 
is able to stay within the boarders of one segment of this diagram. This is because it is 
almost impossible to deal with one aspect of creativity without, to some degree, taking 
into account the others: semiotic resources do not really exist apart from the minds that 
process them and the countless incidents of social interaction through which their 
functions and values are forged; social processes, of course, depend on the workings of 
individual minds and a common store of semiotic resources with which to accomplish 
social actions; and, as Vygotsky (1962) and his followers have so convincingly argued, 
individual cognitive processes are developed and scaffolded through social interactions 
with the aid of semiotic resources and other artefacts. Finally, creative products, whether 
they be durable artefacts like written texts, or more ephemeral verbal phenomena, or 
phenomena that may not seem on the surface to have much to do with language at all 
(such as paintings, machines, music, social identities and social practices) all depend on 
the interaction of cognitive processes, social processes and semiotic resources. Anything 
that is deemed ‘creative’ is somehow the outcome of this interaction. In other words, it is 
more useful to see these different aspects of linguistic creativity not so much as territories 
(which need defending), but as reference points which give us access to different insights 
about the complex phenomenon of linguistic creativity.  
 
WHAT IS CREATED? 
I will begin with the issue of the creative product since, no matter which point of 
reference a scholar settles on, whether he or she is more interested in language as a set of 
resources for creativity or in the cognitive or social processes that result in creativity, the 
creative product must be the starting point, for it is how we know that creativity has 
occurred in the first place. The creative product is evidence of creative processes and, as 
many of the chapters in this book show, it is often the main means through which 
scholars make inferences about how these processes unfold. Sternberg and Lubart (1999: 
3), for instance, define creativity as ‘the ability to produce work that is both novel (i.e. 
original, unexpected) and appropriate (i.e. useful, adaptive concerning task constraints)’ 
(emphasis mine). In this and similar definitions, the nature of creativity as an ‘ability’ is 
premised on particular concrete characteristics of the ‘work’ produced (in this case, 
originality and appropriateness).  
 
But what do we mean by a creative linguistic work? Most studies of linguistic or literary 
creativity begin with the assumption that what we mean is some kind of verbal or textual 
artefact such as a poem, a novel, a conversation, or, even a single metaphor or figure of 
speech. Most people equate the creative linguistic work with the literary work of art, and 
many approaches to language and creativity focus on using tools from linguistics as a 
way of exploring what makes the language of literary works of art ‘literary’ or ‘poetic’. 
This was the starting point for the Russian Formalists and their followers: 'The object of 
study in literary science is not literature’ said Jakobson, ‘but “literariness,”… the specific 
properties of literary material … that distinguish such material from material of any other 
kind’ (quoted in Eichenbaum 1971: 7-8, see also Miall this volume). In this view, the 
main characteristic of creative language is that it is, as Sternberg and Lubart put it above, 
‘novel’, ‘original’ and ’unexpected’ — that it to say, that it is somehow ‘different’ from 
everyday language. This difference has to do not just with the use of particular 
phonological forms (rhythm and rhyme) and ‘figures of speech’ such as metaphors and 
puns, but, more broadly, with the operation of ‘foregrounding’ (Mukařovský 1964) and 
‘defamiliarisation’ (Shklovsky 1917/1965). Foregrounding refers to the way authors and 
poets make certain aspects of their language use ‘stand out’ by deviating from what is 
‘normal’ or expected’. Defamiliarisation refers to the more general process of making the 
familiar seem unfamiliar through language. ‘The technique of art,’ wrote Shklovsky 
(1917/1965:12) is to ‘make objects “unfamiliar,” to make forms difficult, to increase the 
difficulty and length of perception because the process of perception is an aesthetic end in 
itself and must be prolonged.’ Both of these concepts — ’foregrounding’ and 
‘defamiliarization’ — are consistent with Jakobson’s (1960) definition of the poetic 
function of language as that function which draws our attention to the ‘message for its 
own sake’.  
 
These concepts became the basis of early work in stylistics (see for example Leech and 
Short 1981; Fowler 1996—see also Hall this volume, Maill this volume). Even as early as 
the late 1960s, however, disagreements among linguists and literary critics were erupting 
regarding the appropriateness of using principles from linguistics in the analysis of 
literary works of art. In the beginning the concern was whether or not such principles 
could actually capture what was ‘really’ creative about literature, aspects of the literary 
work which involve, as Bateson (quoted in Simpson 2004: 152) famously argued, not just 
‘appropriate stylistic devices’ but also ‘humane value judgements’. By the 1980’s, 
however, the focus of the argument was not so much on why literary language is 
‘special’, but why it is not. Scholars were beginning to notice that those features and 
devices that had been seen to set literary language apart from ‘everyday’ language 
actually occur frequently in everyday conversation and ‘non-literary’ writing (such as 
newspaper articles and advertisements). In 1986, Brumfit and Carter declared it 
‘impossible to isolate any single or special property of language which is exclusive to a 
literary work’ (6), and later, as a result of an exhaustive study of the five million word 
CANCODE corpus of spoken English, Carter (2004: 66) concluded that ‘it may be more 
instructive to see literary and creative uses of language as existing along a cline or 
continuum rather than as discrete sets of features or as a language-intrinsic or unique 
‘poetical’ register.’ No place is this more evident than in the frequent episodes of humour 
and language play that we participate in in our daily lives (Cook 2000; Crystal 1998), but 
it also surfaces in more serious forms of talk whenever we use language in inventive or 
'out of the ordinary' ways.  
 
This more ‘democratic’ view of creativity dominates many chapters in this volume, 
beginning with Maybin’s opening chapter on everyday linguistic creativity, elaborated on 
in Bell’s chapter on humour, Munat’s chapter on lexical creativity, and Goddard’s 
chapter on online creativity, among others, but also finding expression in chapters on 
literary creativity by Stockwell, Maill and Toolen. This view, of course, greatly expands 
what we consider a creative product, but in so doing it introduces new sorts of challenges 
for the analyst. Literary works of art, at least, are bounded, durable artefacts. But the kind 
of creativity described by scholars like Carter and Maybin, occurring as it does in 
stretches of casual conversation, often go undocumented (except by linguists). There is 
also the problem, in such situations, of determining where the creative product begins and 
ends. Are only the parts of a conversation containing metaphors and puns creative, or can 
the whole conversation be seen as a kind of ‘creative work’? 
 
Some analysts solve this problem by focusing on particular forms of creative language 
such as metaphors (Hidalgo this volume) and new words (Munat this volume). Others, 
focus on creative language produced in particular contexts or using particular 
‘technologies of entextualisation’ (Jones 2009). Goddard, for example, as well as Knoble 
and Lankshear, consider the creative language of computer mediated communication, and 
Carrington and Dowdell address the creative aspects of urban graffiti and ‘stickers’. In all 
of these cases, however, what is creative about the texts that these and many other 
authors in this book examine is not just the originality of the language, but the way that 
language interacts with some sort of specific context of communication, and often with 
the broader social or economic contexts of the societies in which it is produced (see Jones 
this volume).  
 The importance of context in judging whether a text is creative speaks to the second half 
of Sternberg and Lubart’s (1999) definition of a creative product. It is not enough that it 
be ‘novel’ and ‘unexpected’; it must also be ‘appropriate’ for a particular time, place, 
audience and task. Of course, what is meant by context can vary from scholar to scholar 
and from text to text. We might, for example, speak of the appropriateness of a metaphor 
in the context of a poem, or the appropriateness of a poem in the context of a particular 
society. Similarly, we might consider the appropriateness of a joke in the context of a 
particular social situation (for example a wedding or a funeral), or we might consider 
whether the joke has broader social or political implications (revealing something, for 
example, about gender or race relations or being used as a indirect means to challenge 
authority). 
 
This whole business of context presents a particular challenge for scholars of everyday 
creativity, particularly those interested in ‘creative’ linguistic forms like puns and 
metaphors, highlighting the fact that whether or not such forms can be considered 
creative depends very much on the context in which they are used. An apparently creative 
utterance exhibiting originality or making use of ‘literary’ techniques like rhyme or 
metaphor may actually be introduced into a totally inappropriate context, and an 
apparently prosaic utterance with nothing at all unique or ‘literary’ about it, may 
constitute a particularly creative use of language in a particular context. What this means 
is that creative language cannot be studied simply by isolating sentences that fulfil some 
formal criteria for 'literariness' or 'originality' from the world in which they were 
produced, any more than the creative language of a novel can be studied by considering 
sentences isolated from the 'world' of the novel (the plot, setting, characters, etc.). In this 
way of thinking, a creative text is always more than just a text, for part of what makes it 
creative is the way that it is contextualised (Jones this volume) and sometimes 
recontextualized (Bauman and Briggs 1990; Knobel and Lankshear this volume; Maybin 
this volume). In fact, Pennycook (2007) goes so far as to assert that much linguistic 
creativity nowadays is not so much about reformulating language as it is about 
recontextualizing it (see also Jones 2015). At the same time, contexts themselves are 
often complex and multilayered, a fact illustrated particularly dramatically in Carrington 
and Dowdall’s discussion of urban textual environments. ‘Every space,’ they write, ‘is a 
layered space — socially and materially — where different texts speak to different 
audiences in different ways and invoke differing norms and authorities. As part of this, 
the textual landscape is a cauldron of creativity as people and texts interact across and 
within these different scales and layers.’ 
 
A related issue, of course, is the fact that, especially nowadays, language is seldom the 
only semiotic means used in creative texts, and so some of what is inventive and 
appropriate in a text comes from the way words interact with other semiotic modes. This 
is most apparent in advertising (see Langlotz this volume) and on the internet, but can 
also be seen in many new forms of literature such as those described in the chapters by 
Gibbons and Simanowski. Multimodality has always been a central aspect of verbal 
creativity: any good actor, storyteller, speech maker, or stand up comic will attest to the 
importance of gestures, facial expressions, and bodily movements for delivering their 
lines effectively, and there has long been a close relationship between the modes of 
spoken language and music (see Jordanous this volume).  
 
This focus on the ‘everyday’ character of linguistic creativity in context inevitably leads 
us to a view of the creative product that is beyond language. Sometimes what is created is 
not ‘creative language’, but rather something else — a new way of doing something, for 
example, or a new way for people to relate to one another. In other words, what is created 
may be the result of language used in a deliberate and artful way, but may not in itself be 
considered a creative linguistic product. A group of business people might use language 
to creatively solve a problem, or a group of diplomats might engage in talks that lead to 
an important breakthrough in relations between two nations. One could not deny the 
centrality of creative language use in such situations, yet what is created is not a creative 
text. Linguistic creativity is sometimes spoken of as occurring on three levels: the level of 
linguistic form, the level of meaning, and the level of language use (Cook 2000; Maybin 
and Swann 2007). The level I am speaking of here is the level of language use, and this 
aspect of linguistic creativity remains the least researched, though it is well represented in 
this volume in chapters by Jones, Maybin, and Carrington and Dowdall, among others. It 
is, as Kramsch (2008: 402) puts it, the ability to use language not just to produce texts, 
but to ‘reframe human thought and action.’ This view of linguistic creativity resonates 
with Dewey’s (1971) notion of situated creativity, creativity as it emerges through our 
interaction with the world. It is also articulated, in a different context, by Toolan (2012: 
18), who defines creativity as ‘the happy fitness of some new solution to a new or 
emergent problem, something we had not fully recognised was a problem.’ 
 What Toolan’s definition hints at is that sometimes the most important things we create 
through language are not solutions, but problems. Indeed, just as creativity in linguistic 
form disrupts our expectations about language, creativity in language use has the 
potential to disrupt habitual social practices, social orders and relationships of power. As 
Lemke (1995) puts it, ‘making meaning’ is one of our most effective ways of ‘making 
trouble’. For many scholars, such as critical discourse analysts (see e.g. Fairclough 1992) 
and cultural critics of the Birmingham tradition (see e.g. Hall 1997; Willis 1990), the 
most potent products of linguistic creativity are these moments of social disruption (see 
Jones this volume).  
 
Finally, there is a perspective that considers the most important products created through 
linguistic creativity to be human languages themselves. This is of course easy to see in 
the case of 'constructed languages' such as those discussed in the chapter by Ball, 
languages that emanate from the mind of a single creator and are often invented in the 
context of other creative products such as novels, films, or television shows, or even in 
the case of other types of constructed languages such as computer languages. It may be 
less obvious in the case of 'natural' human languages, the creation of which is the result of 
many interitive acts of lexical, grammatical, phonological and pragmatic inventiveness by 
individuals and groups over the course of many centuries. In a sense, the languages of the 
world may be considered among the greatest creative products of human kind. Wildgen 
(2004), in fact, asserts that the development of language constitutes the first complex 
expression of human creativity and the foundation upon which all other forms of 
creativity (artistic, scientific) evolved, and the German romantic poet August Wilhelm 
Schlegel (quoted in Chomsky 1966: 17) declared that ‘language is the most wonderful 
creation of the human poetic ability ... it is an always becoming, always changing, never 
complete poem of the whole human race.’ Languages are not only themselves highly 
intricate creative products, but they also provide resources that allow us to articulate the 
world, to create shared meanings, social relationships, and societies, which is the aspect 
of linguistic creativity to which I will turn my attention in the next section. 
 
LANGUAGE AS A CREATIVE TECHNOLOGY 
In order to create, we need materials and tools. Sculpers need granite or marble, chisels 
and hammers, and those who wish to engage in linguistic creativity need language, with 
all of its attendant ‘parts’ (words, sentences, genres and registers). According to Pope 
(2005: xv), linguistic creativity is a process in which the writer or speaker draws from a 
finite number of existing items in order to create an infinite number of fresh or 
imaginative solutions. In this section I will consider not so much this process as the 
potential of language to facilitate this process. Just as any assessment of a great sculptor 
must take into account the kinds of materials he or she uses and the kinds of shapes and 
textures those materials make possible, so any discussion of linguistic creativity must 
account for the nature of language itself, and the kinds of forms, meanings and actions it 
makes possible.  
 
The idea of language as a ‘creative technology’ (Jones 2015) is, of course, not new. It is 
in fact a central tenant of many approaches to linguistics from Chomsky’s (1965) 
generative approach to Halliday’s (1973) functional approach. It is an idea with a long 
history, going back to ancient Greek rhetoricians and philosophers, who painstakingly 
cataloged the many devices language makes available for touching people’s hearts and 
influencing their thoughts, and even further back to the Old Testament in which the act of 
creating the universe is made possible though the word of God (later conceived of as 
logos in the Gospel according to John). It is also an idea which dominated the work of 
many 19th century linguists and philologists like Michal Bréal, who marvelled at how 
language has to power to transform the world by making it speakable’, and who saw 
speaking as more than just encoding thoughts, but as a ‘creative adaptation of means to 
ends’ (Nerlich 1990: 71).  
 
When viewed from this reference point, creativity is not just located in the texts people 
make and the actions people take, but is a fundamental potential embodied in the 
linguistic resources people draw on to make these texts and take these actions. To put it 
in terms popularised by evolutionary psychologist James J. Gibson (1986), language 
makes available certain affordances for creativity, affordances such as the ability to 
combine a limited number of elements into different patterns and to mix it with other 
modes to increase its meaning potential. There is, of course, a ‘flip side’ to the idea of 
affordances, the fact that for all the things a particular tool or technology allows us to do, 
there are also many things that it can prevent us from doing. In other words, along with 
affordances, language also introduces constraints on meaning-making and action. 
However, as numerous authors in this book point out (see e.g. Goddard, Robinson, 
Sawyer, Stockwell, and Tin), one of the great paradoxes of creativity is that it often 
seems as much an outcome of the constraints imposed on creators by the resources they 
have available to them as of the affordances. In her book Creativity from Constraints 
Patricia Stokes (2005: xiii), maintains that the 'creativity problem' is always both 
'strategic and structural': it involves selecting appropriate constraints and working within 
them in novel ways.  
 
The combinations of affordances and constraints for creativity that language offers can be 
seen on multiple levels. They can be seen on the level of lexicogrammar, in the the ability 
language gives us to, as Chomsky (1965: 6) puts it, use a finite number of elements ‘for 
expressing indefinitely many thoughts and for reacting appropriately in an indefinite 
range of new situations.' They can be seen on the level of pragmatics in the ability 
language gives us to combine it with non-linguistic aspects of context in order ‘mean 
more than we say’. And they can be seen on the level of discourse, in the wealth of text 
types languages provide as means of expressing ‘private intentions in the framework of 
socially recognised communicative actions’ (Bhatia 1993: 13). 
 
While, the notion that the creative potential of language lies in its system of grammatical 
rules is usually most closely associated with Chomsky, the seeds of this idea can be found 
in the work of 19th century Cartesian linguists, most notably Humboldt (1836/1999), for 
whom the essence of language was its capacity to ‘make infinite employment of finite 
means’, a capacity he summed up with the term erzuegen. Attempting to understand what 
it is about language that makes this possible was really the starting point for Chomsky’s 
generative grammar. ‘Although it was well understood that linguistic processes are in 
some sense “creative”,’ he wrote in his 1965 Aspects to the Theory of Syntax, ‘the 
technical devices for expressing a system of recursive processes were simply not 
available until much more recently.’ For Chomsky, the solution to the problem of 
language’s creative potential lies in this system of recursive processes that are not 
specific to any particular language, but instead constitute a ‘universal grammar’. 
 
This solution served as a sharp contrast to the view of language held by behaviourist 
linguists like Bloomfield, for whom language was seen as a set of norms and creativity 
was seen chiefly in terms of artful violations of those norms, a view, as I noted above, 
that also dominated early work in stylistics by scholars such as Mukařovský (1964) and 
Spitzer (1948) (for a more extended discussion see de Beaugrande 1979). For Chomsky, 
it is the norms, or, as he conceived of them, the rules of language that make creativity 
possible. ‘True creativity,’ he insists, ‘means free action within the framework of a 
system of rules’ (quoted in Newmeyer 1986: 79).  
 
Chomsky does make a distinction between the everyday creativity of linguistic 
competence  (what he calls ‘normal creativity’ 1974: 152) and the more lasting creativity 
of literature and other art forms, but even in the case of these instances of ‘big C 
Creativity’ (see e.g. Simonton 1994), he insists that what makes them possible are the 
constraints imposed by systems and structures (Chomsky 1976).  
 
There have, of course, been many criticisms of Chomsky’s approach to creativity. Some 
like Harris (1997: 279) criticise him for confusing creativity with ‘productivity’ and 
others like Hymes (1977: 132) criticise him for confusing it with ‘novelty’ Still others, 
like Sampson (1979) find Chomsky’s vision too mechanistic: seeing creativity in terms of 
finite sets and rules, they argue, cannot account for the ability of language to express 
things that hitherto had been inconceivable, and, in some cases, to actually bring those 
things into existence.  
 
Perhaps the most influential alternative to Chomsky’s view of lexicogrammatical 
creativity is that proposed by Halliday (1973) in his Systemic Functional Linguistics. For 
Halliday the creative potential of language is less a matter of some universal set of 
recursive principles and more a matter of the system of choices language offers for 
making meaning in different social situations. In other words, whereas Chomsky views 
language as an essentially cognitive tool, Halliday views it as a social tool, forged and 
used in the context of the social world. It is in this interaction between the structure of 
language and the structure of society that creativity becomes possible. ‘Creativity,’ he 
insists, ‘does not consist of creating new sentences. Creativity consists in new 
interpretations of existing behaviour in existing social contexts; in new semiotic patterns, 
however realised…the creativity of the individual is a function of the social system’ 
(Martin 2013: 36). This is a perspective whose influence can be seen in a number of 
chapters in this volume, including those by Jones, Jaworski, and Van Leeuwen.  
 
An even more radical departure from Chomsky is the integrative linguistics of Roy 
Harris. Based on what Harris (1977) calls ‘the creativity thesis in linguistics’, this 
approach, like that of Chomsky, promotes that idea that creativity is an aspect of all 
language use. Where it sharply diverges from Chomsky is in its insistence that the 
creative potential of language lies not in some self-contained system, but in the ability of 
language to be ‘integrated’ with the physical, psychological and social dimensions of 
whatever situation in which it is used. What is creative about language is that its words 
and its structures can mean very different things in different moments of use. This 
creative potential, however, Harris warned, ‘must remain mysterious until we have a 
linguistics that recognises that communication situations are not the same, and that, 
typically, language supplies only one ingredient of communicative behaviour in any such 
situation' (1990: 49). 
 
Perspectives like those of Halliday and Harris push us towards an understanding of 
language’s creative potential beyond systems of rules governing the combination of 
sounds or words and towards an understanding of language as a tool whose ‘affordances’ 
come from the way it is able to interact with the world, or, to put it in Austin’s (1976) 
terms, away from an emphasis on the ways language allows us to produce an infinite 
number of meanings and towards a perspective that explores the ways language allows us 
to ‘do things with words’. 
 
Interestingly, the most influential proponents of this perspective have not been linguists, 
but rather philosophers and anthropologists. One such figure was the ordinary language 
philosopher H. L. Austin, whose work forms the basis for the linguistic sub-field of 
pragmatics. Ordinary language philosophy is not often associated with the topic of 
creativity, and Austin himself hardly mentioned the word. Some, in fact, like Bertrand 
Russell (1960: 13), explicitly criticised Austin and his associates for ignoring the creative 
potential of language. But, as Jones argues in his chapter on creativity and discourse 
analysis, Austin’s view of the performative nature of language can be seen as essentially 
a theory of radical linguistic creativity, one which insists that the greatest affordance of 
language is not that it allows us to create meanings or texts, but that it allows us to create 
actions, social situations, and social relationships. With Austin, the ‘word’, so to speak, 
becomes ‘flesh’.  
 
Another proponent of this more action oriented view of language was the American 
anthropologist Dell Hymes, who proposed an approach to studying language which 
focuses on ‘not only the organisation of linguistic means, but also the consequence of 
their use’ (1977: 106, emphasis mine). This approach, which Hymes dubbed the 
‘ethnography of speaking’, in his words, ‘shares Chomsky's concern for creativity and 
freedom, but recognises that a child, or person, master only of grammar, is not yet free’ 
(1977: 93-94). He continues:  
 
I share Chomsky's goals for linguistics, and admire him for setting them, but they 
cannot be reached on his terms or by linguistics alone. Rules of appropriateness 
beyond grammar govern speech, and are acquired as part of conceptions of self, 
and of meanings associated both with particular forms of speech and with the act 
of speaking itself. (1977: 94) 
 
Two important points can be made about these more ‘action oriented’ or ‘context 
sensitive’ views of linguistic systems. First, they help to reintroduce into the discussion 
the second component of creativity in Sternberg and Lubart’s (1999) definition discussed 
at the beginning of this introduction, the component of appropriateness. As I mentioned 
above, it is not enough that texts or utterances be unique or original. They must also be 
designed to fit artfully into particular social situations. Second, they remind us that 
language is not a single system, but rather a set of interacting systems ‘whose workings 
are made possible by mutual correlation’ (de Beaugrande 1979: 274). To recognise the 
importance of a system of norms governing The way language is used in particular 
speech events, or a system of ‘maxims’ (Grice 1989) governing processes of 
conversational implicature, in no way denies the importance of the generative capacity of 
language on the level of lexicogrammar. As Hymes (1977: 92) puts it, the goal of such 
approaches is not so much to challenge Chomsky as to ‘complete the discovery of the 
sphere of “rule governed creativity” with respect to language’ (emphasis mine).  
 
Once our view of language as a creative technology is broadened in this way, we are also 
able to consider how other systems of linguistic/cultural convention help to facilitate 
creativity, systems governing things like genres and styles. In her groundbreaking work 
on genre, for example, Devitt (2008) remarks on how, by their very nature, genres 
‘enable creativity’ by presenting writers (and speakers) with sets of choices and 
constraints. This is as true, she insists, for genres not usually thought to be creative such 
as lab reports, as it is for literary genres. This is also a point Pennington makes in her 
chapter on creativity in college composition. Even genres like research papers and 
argumentative essays provide writers with the means to exercise considerable creativity. 
In considering more literary genres, Toolen in his chapter reminds us that ‘forms and 
traditions’ as much as they may constrain us, ‘are resources’ (emphasis mine) which, 
when ‘redeployed in the new circumstances of today’ create new opportunities for 
innovation, or, as he puts it, new ‘problems’ to be discovered. Similarly, Hall (this 
volume), notes, ‘Genre is always mixed, processual (coming-into-being), but also 
constraining and pre-existent, and is therefore arguably both conservative and potentially 
subversive.’ 
 
The same goes for registers or styles, what Gee (2014) (after Bakhtin 1981) calls ‘social 
languages’. Here we are perhaps more inclined to see the connection with creativity since 
the idea of ‘style’ is often associated with the individual ‘voice’ of a particular writer or 
speaker. But styles (registers/social languages) are also governed by systems of use 
characterised by constraints, and it is often through playing with these conventions and 
constraints that creativity is realised. As Hymes (1977: 112) writes, ‘registers are not 
chosen only because a situation demands them; they may be chosen to define a situation, 
or to discover its definition by others…’ He writes similarly of styles, declaring that 
‘knowledge of speech styles is essential to complete the discovery of the sphere of rule-
governed creativity with regard to language’ since ‘it is often complex use of styles that 
underlies individual acts that are creative in the sense of involving meanings and 
mediation and innovation with regard to rules…’ (1977: 106).  
 
Finally, a discussion of language as a creative technology would not be complete without 
a mention of the other technologies it is often used in conjunction with and the systems of 
affordances and constraints they entail. As I mentioned above, language, is hardly ever 
used in isolation from other modes, like font, layout, and images (in the case of written 
language), and gesture, gaze, prosody and object handling (in the case of spoken 
language). The notion of ‘multimodality’ (Kress 2010) goes beyond the fact that people, 
when they are communicating, use more than one mode, to attempting to understand how 
meaning and action are dependent on how these modes (and the systems of affordances  
and constraints they entail) interact with one another. In this regard, both writing and 
speaking are increasingly seen both by scholars of language (e.g. Kress 2010), and by 
scholars of literature (e.g. Hallet 2009) as processes of ‘design’ in which creativity is 
chiefly a matter of playing the affordances and constraints of multiple semiotic systems 
off against one another. This process is evident in the examples given in the chapters by 
Carrington and Dowdall, Gibbons, Jaworski, Jordanous, and Van Leeuwen. 
 
At the same time, language is also mediated through various other technologies like print, 
web pages, film and video, and even the human voice, and these different media also 
involve affordances and constraints. The phonological systems of human languages, for 
example, are constrained by the human articulatory organs and the kinds of sounds and 
sound combinations they make possible. The printed page comes with its own sets of 
affordances and constraints, as do other media like film and television. Recently, of 
course, there has been great interest in the myriad ways digital technologies facilitate 
creativity, from allowing people to mix together different kinds of texts and different 
semiotic modes to allowing them to manipulate the spatial and temporal dimensions of 
language use in dramatically new ways. These are among the issues taken up in the 
chapters by Goddard, Knobel and Lankshear, Simanowski, and Veale. Simanowski, for 
example, describe digital media as encouraging a ‘shift from linguistic hermeneutics to a 
hermeneutics of interactive, intermedial, and performative signs.' As with other 
technologies involved in linguistic creativity, of course, constraints are just as important 
as affordances. As Goddard notes:  
 
One of the issues that arises in identifying an example of language as ‘creative’ in 
the CMC (computer-mediated communication) context is that there have been 
seismic shifts in what Goffman would have termed ‘system constraints’. This 
means that language producers’ starting points can be very different, in terms of 
the raw materials they have to work with.  
 
LANGUAGE AND THE CREATIVE MIND  
Probably the most common way of looking at creativity has been to see it as the result of 
processes that take place in the mind (or ‘imagination’) of the creative individual. Rather 
than seeing creativity a a property of the creative work, or of the semiotic systems that 
make that work possible, this perspective sees creativity as a property of people, whether 
that property be the ‘genius’ of ‘exceptional people’, or the quality of all people which 
makes them capable of thinking, saying or doing ‘exceptional’ things (Carter 2004). This 
approach has not only appealed to scholars from a variety of disciplines, but has also 
captured the popular imagination, particularly in the form of the valorisation of great 
artists, and in various attempts to ‘unlock the secrets’ of the ‘creative mind’ (see e.g. 
Evans 1990).  
 This idea of the ‘creative mind’ is actually not terribly old. Before the Renaissance 
individuals were given very little credit for their own creativity. Instead, creativity was 
seen as the result of possession by some external force such as 'divine inspiration' 
(referred to by Plato as mania). What creative artists aimed for was not to express their 
unique, individual vision or perspective, but rather to give form to some notion of purity 
or perfection or divine truth, accurately represent nature, or successfully imitate the work 
of established masters (Sawyer 2006). Even in the Renaissance, when the idea of 
individual genius was starting to take hold, the majority of creative works were 
collaboratively produced: paintings were produced in workshops where apprentices often 
did much of the work and masters simply added the finishing touches, and literary works 
like plays -- even those of Shakespeare-- often came from the pens of several authors 
working either together or separately.  
 
The idea that creativity is an aspect of the individual (and unique) human mind didn't 
really take strong hold in Europe until the Enlightenment when the notion of the human 
divinity replaced the idea of an external God as the source of all creation (see Nelson this 
volume). Perhaps the strongest expression of this new 'cognitive' view of creativity came 
from Descartes, and it was his ideas that ended up being so influential in later 
conceptualisations of linguistic creativity, including those of Chomsky and his followers 
(see above). Arguing against a mechanistic view of human behaviour, Descartes 
proposed that what separates humans from animals is the ability to think and act in a way 
that is independent of experience, rooted instead in the internal capacity for reason which 
makes it possible for people to ‘operate in all sorts of situations (Descartes 1637/1960:  
47). For Descartes and others of this period, the important thing about thought was not 
just that it proves our existence (cognate ergo sum), but also that it allows us to bring into 
existence and infinite number of new ideas, and to express those ideas in an infinite 
number of new ways through language. While neither animals nor machines are capable 
of such variety of expression, Descartes declared, ‘there are no men so dull-witted and 
stupid, not even madmen, that they are incapable of stringing together different words, 
and composing them into utterances, though which they let their thoughts be known’ 
(47). Here then we have not just the beginnings of a more mentalist idea of creativity, but 
also the seeds of the democratic notion of linguistic creativity championed in various 
ways by modern linguistics (e.g. Carter 2004; Chomsky 1965, 1966).  
 
The idea of the individual as the source of creativity was even more fervently promoted 
in the 18th century by Romantic poets and philosophers whose theories of creativity and 
the imagination are still extremely influential today. The difference between the 
Romantics and the Enlightenment philosophers was not their conviction that creativity 
has its source in the individual, but their beliefs about what aspect of human 
consciousness is most responsible for it. For Descartes and his contemporaries, the source 
of creativity was human reason. For the Romantics, it was human feeling. This conviction 
is reflected in Wordsworth’s (1800/2008: 183) characterisation of poetry as the 
‘spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings,’ and Coleridge’s (1817/1984: 80) 
description of the poetic process as the shaping of ‘deep feeling’ through ‘profound 
thought’ into words that possess a sense of ‘novelty and freshness.’ Two major marks the 
Romantics left on contemporary notions of creativity are, first, what has been called the 
‘cult of originality’ (Millen 2010), the idea that creative works of art must be, above all, 
‘novel’ and ‘unique’, and second, the idea that creativity has its source in the particular 
disposition of the artist, and that the creative process consists of the personal exploration 
and authentic expression of that disposition. 
 
Contemporary research on the creative mind takes place mostly in the disciplines of 
psychology and the cognitive sciences (including cognitive linguistics). In a way, this 
research agenda still retains a trace of the conceptual split between the romantics and the 
rationalists, with some research, especially psychological studies conducted in the later 
half of the 20th century, focusing on discovering the characteristics of the ‘creative 
personality’, and more recent research, especially in cognitive sciences, more interested 
in understanding the cognitive processes associated with creative thinking. 
 
Research into the psychological characteristics of ‘creative people’ has suggested a 
number of traits that seem to be associated with creativity such as flexibility, fluency, 
openness to new experiences, ambition, and self-acceptance. Undoubtably the most 
frequently cited characteristic of creative people discussed in the literature is a penchant 
for ‘divergent thinking’, the ability to generate a large range of diverse yet appropriate 
responses to situations (Guilford 1967), and this observation has been the basis of much 
psychometric testing of creativity, most notably the Torrence Test of Creative Thinking 
(Torrance 1974). In this volume the impact of such work can be seen most clearly in the 
chapter by Kharkhurin on billingual creativity, in which he argues, based on the results of 
such test administered to monolingual and multilingual subjects, that acquiring a new 
language may have a positive impact on creativity, by fostering divergent thinking, and 
attendant traits like flexibility, fluency, ability to elaborate, tolerance for ambiguity, and 
open-mindedness.  
 
Most tests of creativity, while they usually do not test ‘linguistic creativity’ specifically, 
generally use language as the basis for assessment, which raises questions, like those 
discussed by Jordanous in her chapter on language and music, as to whether creativity in 
different semiotic modes is associated with different sorts of mental capacities. Such 
questions as whether or not linguistic creativity is related to visual/spatial creativity, or to 
musical creativity are increasingly important given that producing linguistic texts 
nowadays more often than not means also engaging with other these semiotic modes.   
 
While psychometric research on creative traits has contributed much to our understanding 
of the creative mind, it is research into cognitive processes associated with creativity that 
has had the biggest impact on language and creativity research, as evidenced by the 
strong representation of such theories in this volume (see e.g. chapters by Hidalgo, 
Langlotz, and Stockwell).  
 
Scholars interested in the cognitive processes associated with linguistic creativity start 
from the assumption that language structure and use (including features such as analogy, 
metaphor, conceptual spaces and transformational rules) provide evidence of the creative 
potential of the human mind. As Langlotz points out in his chapter, researchers in this 
area have generally clustered around several key approaches, each with its distinct model 
of human cognition. 
 
The model that will likely be the most familiar to readers is the computational model, a 
model which focuses on the mind as a relatively autonomous central processing unit 
independent of both the body and the social environment and sees linguistic structures as 
evidence of an innate cognitive capacity, a ‘mental module’ (Langloltz, this volume) 
specially designed to generate infinite utterances based on a finite set of rules. This, of 
course, is the model of cognition subscribed to by Chomsky, and, although many 
cognitive scientists have moved on from this model, finding it too narrow and limiting, it 
remains the basis for a challenging field of research that raises questions about the 
capacity for machines, programmed with more and more sophisticated capacities to 
generate original language, can be said to be ‘creative’ (see Veale this volume).  
 
An alternative to the computational model of creativity comes from the field of cognitive 
linguistics, which, rather than regarding language as emanating from an autonomous 
central processing unit which operates based on a set of rules, sees it as arising from a 
broader collection of cognitive capacities including perception, conceptualisation, and 
categorisation (Langlotz this volume). Central to this approach is the idea that cognition 
is embodied, that the way we think is partly determined by the way we experience the 
world though our senses, and that language is chiefly built around these experiential 
parameters.  
 
Cognitive linguists interested in creativity have focused their attention on several key 
aspects of language use, the most important being metaphors, which are treated as not 
just clever rhetorical devices, but as outcomes of cognitive processes of conceptualisation 
and categorisation. Scholars like Lakoff and Johnson (1980) and Gibbs (1994) have 
argued that a key part of the mind’s fundamental capacity for creativity comes from its 
ability to represent so much of reality metaphorically. 
 
Another important contribution to our understanding of creativity that has come out of 
cognitive linguistics is the notion of ‘mental spaces’ (Fauconnier 1994) — mini models 
of the world and of experience which we build in our minds and map in relation to other 
mental spaces. This idea forms the basis of Fauconnier and Turner’s (2008) ‘blending 
theory’, which offers a model of creative thinking that is more dynamic and situated than 
conceptual metaphor theory. People come up with new ideas, it argues, through 
selectively mapping and blending mental spaces, thereby generating new mental 
structures. 
 
It is work in cognitive linguistics that has most profoundly influenced research on the 
cognitive aspects of literary creativity, which includes not just work on the creative 
production of literary texts, but also on the creative mental processes readers use then 
they interpret them. ‘Cognitive poetics’ (Stockwell 2002a; Tsur 2008) and ‘cognitive 
stylistics’ (Stockwell 2002b; this volume), draw on a range of theories from cognitive 
linguistics to understand, for example, how devices of foregrounding in literary texts 
operate cognitively, how literary metaphors related to more universal conceptual 
metaphors, how texts work to create cognitive ‘frames’ through which readers interpret 
characters’ words and actions, and how readers and writers work together to create ‘text 
worlds’ — mental representations of the fictional world of the literary work which 
readers map against their own experience and use to track various states of knowledge 
and experience, As literary works have become more multimodal, there has also been 
interest in applying concepts from cognitive linguistics to understanding how viewers 
process visual imagery and how they relate it to written text (see e.g. Forceville 1996, 
2012; Gibbons 2012, this volume; Hiraga 2005). 
 
One potential danger of focusing on creativity in terms of cognitive processes that take 
place in the minds of individuals is that it can lead analysts to ignore the fact that 
individuals exists in societies and cultures, and much of the way they think is shaped and 
influenced by their interaction with other people. One set of approaches to cognition 
which attempts to address its social aspects are those which focus on what is referred to 
as ’distributed’ or ‘situated cognition’ (see e.g. Hutchins and Klausen 1996), and these 
are complemented in the literature on creativity in work on what has come to be known 
as ‘distributed creativity’ (Glăveanu 2014). Such approaches have their roots in the work 
of Soviet psychologist Lev Vygotsky (1962), who saw human cognition as mediated 
through ‘cultural tools’, the most important being language itself. From this perspective, 
all cognition is essentially social, supported by the resources made available to the 
thinker by his or her society and reflecting the structures of that society. This more 
socially grounded approach to creative cognition has also influenced approaches to 
linguistic creativity based on mediated discourse analysis (see e.g. Jones et al. 2012).  
 CREATIVITY AS A SOCIAL PRACTICE 
In contrast to the more individualistic and mentalist perspectives of most cognitive 
approaches to creativity are approaches that see creativity not as a process that takes 
place in the minds of individuals but as a kind of social practice which is embedded in 
particular social contexts and depends on various forms of social interaction. The key 
point of such approaches is not just that creative texts are forms of ‘communication’ with 
which creators interact with audiences and are judged based on the values and fashions of 
the societies in which they are created, but that the creative act itself is social, and that the 
notion of the ‘creative mind’ as an entity independent of other creative minds is 
essentially a fiction. As Carter (2004: 28; see also his Forward to this volume) puts it, 
acts of creativity are ‘responsive, dialogic, interpersonal acts of mutuality’, not limited to 
what Chomsky describes as our ability to produce and understand an unlimited number of 
new sentences.  
 
Like the concept of the creative individual, more socially grounded conceptions of 
creativity have a long history. In fact, as I mentioned above, viewing the creative process 
as the result of the interaction of multiple individuals and institutions was actually the 
norm before the late Renaissance. Interestingly, many of the same philosophers and 
linguists who inspired individualistic, cognitive views of creativity and contributed to this 
more social perspective. Humboldt’s (1836/1999) notion of erzeugen (meaning to 
produce or generate), for example, which so inspired Chomsky (see above), also posits a 
key role for society upon which individual production depends. Language constitutes 
more than just ‘a linkage of thoughts’, but also a ‘world-view’ that presupposes ‘the 
understanding of all’ and ’rests upon the collective power of man’ (44). 
 
Among the most influential critiques of the individualistic idea of creativity in the field of 
language studies comes from the Soviet literary critic Mikhail Bakhtin. As Maybin (this 
volume) argues, perhaps Bakhtin’s greatest contribution to our understanding of language 
and creativity was his insistence, in opposition to the formalist views of linguistic 
creativity dominant in his day, that ‘the aesthetics of language must have a social 
dimension.’ The operation of this social dimension of linguistic creativity is explained by 
Bakhtin through his concepts of heteroglossia and dialogism (see Jones, this volume). 
With his concept of heteroglossia, he challenged the idea of that the essence of creativity 
consists of our ability to generate ‘new’ and ‘unique’ utterances. Such utterances, he 
argues, do not really exist. All utterance are cobbled together from the words of others. 
Creativity lies not in our ability to say new things, but to say them in new ways in new 
contexts, to effectively mix together the voices of others and to give to them our own 
’accent’ (Bakhtin 1981: 293). With the concept of dialogism, he challenged the idea of 
the autonomous creator. All utterances are created in response to previous utterances and 
in anticipation of future utterances. Thus, all linguistic creativity is a matter of social 
interaction or ‘dialogue’ between the writer or speaker and both those who have written 
or spoken before him or her and those who will write or speak afterwards. 
 
The ideas of Bakhtin play a central role in many of the chapters in this book, including 
those by Bhatia, Jaworski, Jones, Maybin, and Swann. They are also evident (though not 
explicitly acknowledged) in Knobel and Lankshear’s notion of ‘creative remix’ and in 
Carrington and Dowdall’s description of polyphonic urban landscapes. 
 
One area of study that Bakhtin’s concepts of heteroglossia and dialogism opens up is the 
consideration of the reader’s role in the creation of literary texts, not just the reader as a 
cognitive entity, as conceived of in some of the work in cognitive stylistics reviewed 
above, but the reader as a social being, ‘located within particular sociohistorical, cultural 
and local interpersonal contexts that make available certain forms of engagement with 
text and potentially certain textual interpretations’ (Swann, this volume). Another area 
Bakhtin’s work opens up is the study of how these interpretations change as texts and 
utterances travel across what Lillis (2013) calls ‘text trajectories’ and what Scollon 
(2008) calls ‘itineraries of discourse’. In both of these cases, linguistic creativity is seen 
less as a matter of ‘generating’ or interpreting texts, and more as a matter of sharing, 
contesting, and transforming them in the course of social interaction. 
 
Apart from the foundational work of Bakhtin, insights concerning the social dimensions 
of linguistic creativity also come from key work in anthropology and sociolinguistics, 
particularly around the notion of ‘performance’. The work of anthropologists on verbal 
performances associated with such events as religious rituals, for example, helps to 
highlight the situated and occasioned nature of linguistic creativity, how it, in the words 
of Bauman and Sherzer (1989: xvii-xix) arises from the ‘dynamic interplay between the 
social, conventional and ready-made in social life and the individual, creative and 
emergent qualities of human existence’ (see Maybin, this volume). Work in 
sociolinguistics, on the other hand, shows how linguistic performance permeates 
everyday life in the form of stylization and style-shifting (Coupland 2007; Eckert 2000), 
code-switching and ‘crossing’ (Rampton 2005), and what has come to be known as 
‘translanguaging’ (Garcia and Li Wei 2004; see also Kharkhurin this volume), all of 
which are forms of linguistic creativity that are intimately tied to expressions of social 
identity and group affiliation. 
 
‘Performance’ is also a key theme in studies on collaborative linguistic creativity such as 
those conducted by Sawyer (2001; this volume). Basing his observations on the study of 
improvisational theater, but arguing they they apply equally to the ‘improvisational’ 
nature of everyday conversation, Sawyer shows how individuals work together to create 
social realities through the negotiation of ‘frames’ in interaction. This work draws on a 
large body of work in conversation analysis and interactional sociolinguistics, work also 
discussed by Jones in his chapter on the discursive dimensions of linguistic creativity, 
which explores the ways social interaction involves people working together to jointly 
perform social actions, construct social situations, and enact social identities.   
 
Perhaps the most important contribution that a more socially grounded view of creativity 
can make is to show how linguistic creativity is not just socially constituted, but also 
socially consequential — how it can actually act as a force to change the societies in 
which we live. In 1926 the Marxist literary critic Georg Lukács (1926/2011) railed 
against an attitude towards art which focused only on its aesthetic value, ignoring its 
social function. ‘This social uprootedness of the artist goes hand in hand with the inner 
rootlessness of art,’ he said (160). The same might be said of theories of everyday 
linguistic creativity which limit their view of the creative to formal aspects of people’s 
utterances. A socially grounded view of linguistic creativity leads inevitably to a socially 
engaged view, one which asks questions like what are the effects of social orders and 
economic system on people capacity for linguistic creativity, and in what ways can our 
facility for linguistic creativity be called into the service of affecting positive social 
change? These are questions that are explicitly raised in the chapters by Jones and 
Maybin, and hinted at in the contributions from Sawyer, Knobel and Lankshear, and 
Carrington and Dowdell. 
 
Maybin raises these questions in the context of performance, pointing out that verbal 
performances, by virtue of their power to call attention to and heighten our awareness of 
language use, constitute unique opportunities for performers to challenge linguistic 
conventions and the social conventions associated with them. Jones raises these same 
questions in the context of resistance, suggesting that among the most important aspects 
of linguistic creativity is its potential to disrupt dominant ways of thinking and talking 
about things that support relationships of power and inequality, its potential to create 
‘cracks’ in the discursive edifices that protect some members of our societies and 
marginalise others.  
 
Creativity, of course, has multiple functions in human societies. It can be used to 
entertain and engage people or to distract them, to solidify social relationships or to 
create wedges between ‘us’ and ‘them’, to inspire, to amuse, to educate, to solve 
problems or to make mischief. All of these functions have consequences for people’s 
well-being, their security, their agency and their freedom, and theories of language and 
creativity must eventually find ways to address these consequences.  
 
Finally a more socially grounded and socially engaged take on linguistic creativity must 
acknowledge that creativity is itself socially constructed and ‘discursivly constituted’ 
(Nelson this volume). All definitions of creativity (and all definitions of language for that 
matter) are products of particular political and economic conditions and serve the 
interests of particular social groups. This is particularly evident today as businesses, 
governments and educational institutions promote definitions of ‘creativity’ which 
reproduce neoliberal notions of productivity and individual responsibility (Hall 2010; 
Hocking 2011). But, as Nelson’s chapter persuasively demonstrates, ‘the creative idea’ 
has always been shaped by the dominant ideologies of particular time periods, and well 
as helping to shape those ideologies. What is of particular interest in Nelson’s chapter is 
not just the surprising roots of contemporary notions of creativity in scientific rather than 
artistic discourse, but also her wider observations about how, over they years, the notion 
of creativity has been shaped by ‘the ideologies of individualism, the ideas of democracy 
and freedom, the rise of capitalism, and indeed the foundations of the modern nation 
state.’ 
 
Understanding how our views of linguistic creativity are themselves shaped by language, 
and how the dominant ‘orders of discourse’ of our societies affect how we think about 
creativity, talk about it, and study it, should be a central concern for any scholar 
interested it language and creativity. Of course, as Nelson reminds us, to say that 
creativity is discursively constructed is not to say that it is not real, ‘for discourse has a 
weight and a materiality and a productive power.’ The strongest evidence for the creative 
potential of language, in fact, might be its ability to create ‘creativity’ itself. 
 
THE WAY THIS BOOK IS ORGANISED 
One of the biggest challenges of editing any book is organising the chapters in a coherent 
way, and, perhaps because of the rich and varied ways of understanding the relationship 
between language and creativity I have outlined above, I found that settling on a principle 
of organisation for the chapters in this book particularly daunting. In the end I settled on 
organising the chapters into four sections as outlined below, but it won’t take readers 
long to find chapters that address issues that straddle these sections, or chapters that, for 
one reason or another, might have been situated in a different section than they are.  
 
In the first section, which I call ’Dimensions of Language and Creativity’ I have placed 
chapters which deal with different aspects of ‘everyday linguistic creativity’ and which 
introduce key theoretical approaches from fields such as applied linguistics, cognitive 
sciences, discourse analysis, and psychology. Of course, when I speak of ‘everyday 
linguistic creativity’ I am not just talking about casual conversation, but include all sorts 
of linguistic creativity from advertisements to political speeches. This section begins with 
Janet Maybin’s overview of everyday linguistic creativity which draws on theories from 
applied linguistics, anthropological linguistics, and sociolinguistics. Following this are 
chapters by Andreas Langloltz on cognitive approaches to linguistic creativity, Rodney 
Jones, on discourse analytical approaches, Keith Saywer, on the dialogic nature of 
linguistic creativity, Judith Munat on lexical creativity, Laura Hidalgo on metaphor, and 
Nancy Bell on humour and language play. After that is a chapter by Douglas Ball on 
constructed languages, and one by Vijay Bhatia on creativity in corporate and 
professional communication, which draws on principles from critical genre analysis. The 
section ends with Camilla Nelson’s reflection on the discursive construction of the idea 
of creativity itself, particularly as it developed in 19th and 20th century Europe and 
American as a response to both political conditions and advances in scientific thinking. 
 
The second section of the book deals with ‘Literary Creativity’, particularly those 
approaches to literature like stylistics which apply linguistic tools to understanding the 
nature of ‘literariness’ and processes of literary creation and literary reading. The opening 
chapter by David Miall on literariness sets the scene for this section, laying out some of 
the major debates surrounding this notion. This is followed by chapters by Geoff Hall on 
literary stylistics, Peter Stockwell on cognitive stylistics, Michael Toolan on poetry, and 
Andrea MacRae on narrative. The section ends with a more socially oriented take on 
literary reading by Joan Swann, and an exploration of the challenges associated with 
literary translation by Douglas Robinson. 
 
The third section of the book, entitled ‘Multimodal and Multimedia Creativity’ contains 
chapters that consider both the relationship between linguistic creativity and other modes 
of expression, and the effect of technology on linguistic creativity. It begins with a 
chapter by Alison Gibbons on literature and multimodality, which serves as a bridge 
between this section and the previous one. After that is a chapter on language and music 
by Anna Jordanous, and one on silence and creativity by Adam Jaworski. Theo Van 
Leeuwen’s chapter, in which he examines the creative grammar of movement in the 
mechanistic artworks of Jean Tinguely, incorporates both a focus on multimodality and a 
focus on technology. Following that are four chapters which address the impact of digital 
technology on creative linguistic practices: a chapter by Tony Veale that discusses the 
capacity for computers to exercise linguistic creativity, a chapter by Angela Goddard on 
creative language use in text based computer-mediated communication, a chapter by 
Roberto Simanowski on digital literature, and a examination of the culture of digital 
‘remix’ by Michele Knobel and Colin Lankshear. The section ends with Victoria 
Carrington and Clare Dowdall’s exploration of creative linguistic landscapes.  
 
In the final section, ‘Creativity in Language Teaching and Leaning’, I have placed 
chapters that focus on pedagogical aspects of linguistic creativity. The opening chapter 
by Tan Bee Tin discusses creativity in second language teaching and learning. This is 
followed by a chapter by Anatoliy Kharkhurin that explores the connection between 
multilingualism and cognitive process associated with creativity and introduces an 
educational programme that takes advantage of this connection. Following that are 
chapters by Gillian Lazar on literature and language teaching, Martha Pennington on 
creativity in the teaching of composition, and Graeme Harper on the teaching of creative 
writing.  
 
This Handbook is by no means an exhaustive treatment of the vast and growing field of 
language and creativity studies, and there are many important topics and many important 
theoretical perspectives that are missing. I take these obvious gaps not just as a reason to 
offer my apologies to readers who have not found what they are looking for in these 
chapters, but also as a reason to celebrate the diversity of work addressing issues related 
to language and creativity, work that is too rich and varied to be accommodated in any 
single book.  
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